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COMMISSION  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  COUNCIL 
on  a  Mediterranean  policy for  the  enlarged  Community 
:: 
COM{82)  353  final THE  NEED  FOR  A NEW  INITIATIVE 
The  Mediterranean~obl~~ 
1o  On  21  June  1979  the Commission  presented a  report to the Council  on 
the consequences of enlargement for rela.·tions with :noflocomember  countries  .. 
It dealt  a.t  length t·dth the situation of the Mediterranean countries 
<\.L:inked  by  special  cooperation  arrangements  to· the  Community  in  the 
framework  of  the  "overall  r-1editerranean  approach"  worke-d  out· in  1'972~  1 
Concluding Hs reportl  the Commission  said:  "As  soon as the state of 
the negotiations permits9  it will present  specific proposals for 
solutions which  wHl  safeguarcl the policy of openness  and  cooperation 
on which it has  embarked  rJi th the Mediterranean countries and  the 
developing  coun·~ries in order  ·!:;o  contri  but  a  ·t.owa.rda  ·their economic  and 
social development""  This  commu.,;··.dcation  t'ltlfila that undertaking as 
regards the Medi terranea.n co·®trieao 
2~  In the Commission•s  view7  however?  the new  solutions caru1ot  be 
based solely on  an update  of the current Mediterranean policy to take 
acco·W1t  of the  impac·t  of enlargement"  That  policy is not  operating 
to the satisfaction o:f.  our  par·t:nera1  e...nd  it is  necessat'Y  to  take  into 
. account  the  reasons  for  the  present difficulties.  Consequently  we  must 
consider  briefly  why  the  overall  Mediterranean  approach  adopted  in 
1972  has  not  given all  the  results  expected 
I 
1  The  "overall  approach"  covers all Mediterranean li  tto;'al  coum;rJ.es 
wishing to maintain special ties with the Communityp· plus  Jordan., 
Turkey,  which  a.lre~ had.  an  association relationship with the 
Communi t.y 1  does  not  come  1.Ulder  the  11overall  approa,ch"  c  Howeverp 
what  follows  is also  broadly relevant  to that  countr'J  9  thotlgh  in 
practice specific political and  ins·titutional  arrangements  ID!3\Y  be 
made  to cater for Hs special poa:i:tiona -2-
THE  LIMITS  OF  THE  OVERALL  APPROACH  OF  1972 
3.  The  basic problem has  been that  a  policy devised in the  boom  years 
of the  1960s was  only put  into effect in leaner times,  against  a 
background  of world recession and  consequent  internal Community  crisis, 
the first  "Mediterranean"  symptoms  of which were making themselves 
felto  As  a  result it was. difficult to apply the Mediterranean 
agreements properly,  let alone develop themu 
Accordingly: 
(a)  The  Community's  fa.I'-reaching concessions  on  the  indm;trial  side 
-·---·----------··-·  ~  ... _________  --- .... 
have not  had the desired results.  Given  sustained expansion, 
they  should have  stimulated  an  increase in exportr;  of  ma  .. nu.fa.ctu.rcs 
in line with the objective of the agreements,  encouraging 
industrialization in the Mediterranean countries and  thus 
offsetting the inevitable limitations of the agricultural clauseso 
In the event,  however,  the industries which  could  have  produced 
the  export  growth were  precisely those the recession rendered 
"sensitive" in the Community .. 
(b)  The  Commurlity's  internal Mediterra.nea.n problems 1  due  largely to 
the legacy  o'f  the past  and  exacerbated  by  a.  common  agricultural 
policy  skewed  against  Medi terra1;ean crops  and  an  inadequate 
regional  development  policy have  made  it impossible to give 
practical effect to the review clauses in the various agreements. 
(c)  The  employment  situation in the Community  has  considerably reduced 
the openings for migrant  labour on which  some  of our Mediterranean - 3-
partners have  been  accustomed to  re~ing as  a  means  of improving 
their trade balance with the Community  and  easing their own 
la·bour  marketa 
4o  In these  circumstances the Mediterranean pa.rtners 9  aggregate trade 
deficit with the Community,  which the  agreements  had been  intended to 
reduce,  actually grew from  just over 4  000  m ECU  in 1973  to 
just  over  9  000  m ECU  in  1979~  This  trend  has  greatly 
contributed  to  the  decision·  of  some  of  our 
partners to  impose  severe  import  curbs which have hit Community 
exports hardo 
back,  these 
As  essential food  imports9  a  major  item,  cannot  be cut 
curbs  have  fa~len disproportionately on capital goodsp 
which in the  long run could  jeopardize the whole  development  processa 
Most  of these countries are also facing the prospect  of  a  decline in 
the remittances from  migrant  worker~ which  are  so  important for their 
balance  of plzy1llentso 
The  impact of enlargement 
5..  None  of these  problems  has  been  caused  by  the fact  or  prospect  of 
enlarc•::mcnt  ::JJ1d 7  whether the Community  acquires  another  two  members 
or not 7  there is little prospect  of simply reviving the old policyo 
Nevertheleos7  as  the barriers to free movement  of goods  between 
prospective  and  present members  are dismantled in the course of the 
transition period,  the Mediterranean partners could well  find 
themselves facing even tougher competition on the Community  marketr 
not  least in the tensitive Community  sectors to \.Yhich  ~vheir exports 
are largely gearedo  F'urtlv;::r,  the greater ease  of acces::J  to  employment 
which  SpaniBfl  n.ncl  PorLuguec:e  workers  will enjoy in the  Community 
fran1ework  could  nhut  the  doors  on  immigration from  the other 
Hediterranean countries for a  very long time  indeeda -4-
6. ·  The  consequences willnot  be  so drastic as  people  som~tirnes claim, 
overlooking,  for  instance,  the fact  that most  of the applicant 
countriest exports of sensitive industrial  and  agricultural products 
already go  to the .Community  a.nywa(f. 
The  future  Member  States'  ado.ption of the preferential agreements 
linking the Community  with the Mediterranean countries and their 
alignment  generally on the more  liberal Community  import  rules are 
undoubtedly positive £actors which  should not  be overlookedo  Again, 
as the Commission  indicated in its 1979  report,  additional £actors 
such  as the relative decline in the  applicant countries' 
competitiveness which  could follow their adoption of'  Community  social, 
ta~ and  competition rules  should soften the blow  of'  enlargement. 
Having said that,  there  are  the longer-term effects which  any 
objective analysis of the problems must  take into consideration but 
which  should not  blind us to the fact that in the short  term the 
export  openings  created for  our Mediterranean partners on  the 
Portuguese  and  Spanish markets will be  extremely limited, 1vhereas 
the new  Member  States will  immediately get a  real competitive 
advantage  on the Community  market  o 
Ovr.ora.ll,  th<:!rcforc~  t!'lC  impact  of enlargement  on  the 
Mediterranean countries will depend to  a  great extent  on the proportion  of 
exports  of  each  partner  to  the  Community  represented  by  products  that  constitute 
a  major  part  of  the  candidates'  exports. 5 ... 
7o  In its 1979  report the Commission  noted that the agricultural 
prod.uct a  to  be  considered irt assessing the  impact  of enlargement  were 
citru.s fruits,  particularly oranges and  small  fruit~p fresh tomatoes, 
potatoes,  especially new  potatoes, wine  and  olive oil,  which 
nr:ooWI t.  Cor  tlH:  bll.Ik  or  -uie  Community' B  agricultural 
imports from  countries in the Mediterranean area.  They  are also the 
ones which are posing pro'blems  because of the level of Spain's present 
and  potenti~l production. 
As  :far as manufactures  a:re  concerned, the main problem is with processed 
food,  especially  tomato  concentrates,  fruit  juice  and  canned  fish,  textiles. 
B.  Again,  most  of' the applicant countries' migrant  workers  already 
;-...:.;-=.;,:::;__;:..;,·--~ 
go  to the Community  anyw~.  This is the field in which it is most 
difficult to forecast  the effects of'  enlargement with any  con:fidence. 
However,  it seems  fairly safe to  s~ that the immigration controls 
imposed  by Member  States to keep the in:flow of foreign workers within 
limits compatible not  only with the  job situation in the Community,. 
but  also with the need to integrate existing immigrant  communities 
and  limit  the  social  cost  of  immigration,  will  remain  in  force  ave~ -6-
the next decade,  ruling out  any  immigration on the scale our partners 
might  have wished.  The  full  impact  of free movement  will only make 
itself felt  at the  end  of the  tr~sition period,  on  which the 
Community  _has  already  taken  a  prudent  position,  and. this  is  beyond  the  range  of 
any  meaningful  immigration  forecasts.  Having  said that,  the 
Mediterranean  countries from  \vhich  there has traditionally been 
considerable  emigration to  the Community  are  the  ~~hreb countries, 
Turkey  and Yugoslavia1• 
Our  partners are also worried that after enlargement,  the Community 
might  take an  even tougher  stand on social security for migrant 
workers;  as it is, the social clauses in the agreements  have not 
yet been fully implemented. 
9·  In its 1979  report the Commission,  after considering the weight 
of these  factors  for  each  country,  concluded  that  the  countries  which  __ 
stood to lose the most  were  CyprusD  Malta,  MOrocco,  Tunisia,  Israel 
2 
and,  to a  lesser extent,  Turkey  •  Furthel.'  analysis has confirmed 
this view. 
Cyprus is heavily dependent  on the  UK  market,  which  in 198o  took 
9o%  of its total exports of vegetables  and  75%  of its exports of 
fruit3.  Cyprus  has  made  a  ~erious effort to  diversif~ on  to Middle 
Eastern and Arab  markets,  but would  be  hard hit if forced to  cut back 
substantially on  its exports to  the Community,  which account for 60%  of 
all agricultural exports  and  39%  of its total exports. 
1Yugoslavia has  a  policy of mostly temporary emigration and,  with this 
in view,  has for a  long time  collaborated with host  countries in 
resettling emigrant workers. 
~~e footnote  J  on  page  1. 
v'YPrus's main agricultural exports m-e  new  potatoes,  citrus fruits 
and  wine. - 7 -
Na1f.a  is a  special case.  Its vulnerability arises chiefly from  the facl 
tha::  textiles accotmt  for  by  far the largest  proportion  (47%)  of its exports 
to  the  Community. 
Murocco 1 s  experts  to  the  Cornr.,un·ity  represent  a  l<-ryc  IJur·::  o1  its GNP,  and  despite 
its  substantial  phosphate  exports  (about  25  %of  total  exports)it  is still  heavely 
dependent  on  sales  of  Mediterranean  fruit  and  vegetables  Cover  SO%  of  total 
agri culturaL  exports)  and  of  textiLe  products  (15%). 
Tunisia is likelri se very dependent  on  a  number  of highly sensitive products, 
t  f  ·t  d.t  xt1"les  Oliv·e oil in ·particular not  particularly olive oil,  ci  rus  ru1  s  an  e  •  -
only  accounts  for  more  than  50%  of  the  country's  agricultural  exports  and  more 
thc'n  10'?S  of its total  exporto,  "but  is a  major  source  of  employment  (olive 
1  i  Or  m'·1  ...  ~ r1  sourc''  of income  of  about  2o%  of  the  oil is the  cxc  us  vc  - v 
populationo) 
Israel's  exports  are also  geared  quite  heavily  to  Mediterranean  products, 
notab~y citrus fruits,  fruit  juice and  cut  flowers  (together  they  represent 
16%  of  its total  and  50%  of  its agricultural  exports).  However,  it  has  a  far 
wider  export  range  than  the  countries  discussed  above,  and  among  the 
Mediterranean  partners  it  will  undoubtedly  be  the  one  best  able  to  take 
advantage  of  the  lowering  of  Portuguese  and  Spanish  tariffs and  the  elimination 
of  other  measures  which  make  exporting to  those  countries difficulto 
10.  The  other Mediterranean partners,  including the Mashreq  countries,  are 
much  less dependent  on  exports of the sensitive products;  anyway,  they 
depend  far  less od the  Community market  as .it is,  and·  have virtually no 
migrant  workers in the Member  Stateso  Algeria exports  main~ petroleum 
products and is not  likely to suffer from  stiffer Spanish and  Portuguese 
competition after accession. - 8-
Yugoslavia is also a  special case.  Its agricultural trade with the 
Community  is less geared to the typical Mediterranean crops  and its 
industrial exports are more  diversified.  But  it is necessary to take into 
account  the precarious  balance  of  this  country  resulting  from  the  contrast 
between  trends  in  its  trade  balance  with  th~  Communitv  ~nrl  those  with 
Eastern  Europe.  The  m~intenance of  this  balance  ~ust  be  seen  in  t~e  light  of 
the  country's  role  in  the  Mediterranean  equilibrium  as  a  whole,  and  in 
shaping  non-alignment  and  development  policy,  which  make  it a  key  partner  for 
the  conduct  of  a  new  Mediterranean  policy. 
The  importance of the Med.i terranean area as a  •~hole 
11.  Let  us not  be misled  by such distinctions,  however;  if the  Community, 
responding to pressures  at  home,  took  steps to  curb imports  from  the most 
heavily-committed suppliers,  damage  would  be  done to the stability of the 
whole Mediterranean area  • 
. The  Community  must  take care to see that  loss of market  access  does not 
irreparably destroy the fragile balance of relations  ~rith the Mediterranean 
countries.  It is vital for these countries,  with their fast-growing 
populations,  to maintain an  economic  balance and continue with the development 
process,  and  ousted  from  Community  markets,  they could only  turn  elsewhere. 
Inevitably,  they would  forge  closer political ties with their new  trading 
partners,  and  both the economic  and the political consequences would  be 
serious. - 9 -
12..  Since  1972  the  area has  gro\m  steadily more  important  to  the  Community 
in economic  terms..  It is a  major route  for fuel and  raw materials supplie,s, 
and.  an important  link with the  Arab  world..  The  Mediterranean  countries are 
already major trading partnersf  taking more  than  10%  of total Community 
exports,  and  offer a  potentially much  larger market,  provided they can meet 
the  development  needs of their growing  populationso  To  do  this,  they must 
increase their exports in order to. pay for the extra capital goods and  food 
imports that they will require;  and  the  Community is far and  av~y their 
largest marketo 
13.  They  could,  of  course,  look  for  other  markets  and  they  are  starting to  do  so. 
certain  countries of  the  Middle  East  and  the  Gulf  could offer  supplementary 
outlets  for  various  products,  while  the  new  markets  emerging  in  Africa  may  pos-
sibly provide opportunities  that  are  not  neglectable.  However  these  can  not  be 
more  than  relatively minor  outlets,  and  increased  access  to  them  supposes  more 
active  trade  promotion.  The  other  potentially  large markets  are not  generally 
orientated towards. the  Mediterranean  countries.  So  the  only  market  that  could . 
. offer fill  the  gap  left by the  Community  is that  of  Eastern  Europe,  at  any  r.<~t:e 
in the.short  term.  The  Mediterranean partners  themselves  fear  such  a  development 
of  their trade. 
The  Community  of  Twelve  remains  the  indispensable outlet  for  the  exports  of 
Mediterranean  countries,  and  i~  indeed their natural  partner  in  develo~ment. 
It is  in its best  interest  to  av6id  increasing their economic  and  social 
difficulties  which  might  encourage  the destabilisation of'the  region.  The 
Community  should  therefore  show  itself to the Mediterranean  countries a  reliable 
partner,  whose  trade  and  aid policies  can  be  counted on  in  long  term.  This  implies 
~hat  in  future  the  Community  must  ensure it is better able  than in the  past  to 
stand by  its undertakirgs  in  sptte.of  continuing  recession  and  the.risk that 
internal  cohesion  will  diminish  after enlargemeht. - 10  -
14~  It is on  the  operat:i.un  of the  t:cade  clauses of the  agrc:ementr;  that 
thr~  :o;ucce ss  of tLe  Gonnnuni ty  t s  Medi terr-B.nea:n  policy mHst  dr:;pend~  IrJcre.'],se d 
cooperation acti·v-l ties9  ev-en  fina.ncial  aiel~  cmmot  compensate  for a  declir:e 
in trade;  thei:cs  i  fl  a  back-up ft.mction., 
This is not  to  say  tha,t  ways  should 1:ot  1:!>·.3  sought  of mi.ni.mizing  the 
problems  caused by imports in sensitive  seetol~B~  Ti'1is  i8 r:ot  to  b8  r1chieved 
by·  throttling- tra.de i  i,e  D  cuttiD[; imports,  but  'by t1·ying  to  achie-.re  better 
trade  compl0rne:ntari  ty:o  It should  h~3  borr~e  in mind that  t{lrile  development 
Tift~  filP.I.N  EmHE:NTS  OF'  A  HEDITf~Rffl\...NISAN POLICY  FOH  'l'HE  THELVE  ------------- ........... -~~-·-------.. ---... --~-·.......,---·---~----.......... -.. -
15.  "Mediten•ra:nean prod.uds"  (see  abovB)  ge:nera.ll;y- hf'Lve  .S\.  limited export 
ma.rket 9  slow and  cliff:l.cuJ.t  t.o  expa:nd~  so  cvt  present they tend to  be 
marketed a.nd  conm1med.  i11  or :near the  B.l"G<'J,  of product:i.Ol\.,  iii  th:i.n  the 
Mect.Herre.nee;n  area. as a  ~-.r.hole  ~  there  fore~  i 1;  is important to  prev-ent  the 
fGrmation of stJ:·w;tv.raJ.  surpluses~  ;..;hich  'i'iOllld  la.rge1.y have  ·t;o  be  d.e s"troy-ed. ~ 
being nei  th<O!r- easily se,leable  on  the  ·.-;orld  ma.rk.e·i;-;  nor umch use in the 
fight against hunger in ·the  Third  World.~ - 11  -
The  fact  that  the outlets  are  l.imited  means  that  the  Community  market  is  even 
more  important  for  Mediterranean  countries.  Hence,  in  the  immediate  future,  the 
Community  must  commit  itself to  a  consolidation  ~f their  exports  to  allow  the 
products  of  the  Mediterranean  countries  covered  by  the  agreements  to  maintain 
their  access  to  Community  markets. 
In  order  to  avoid  any  situations  likely to  create serious  sectoral  disturbances, 
the  Community  and  its partners  will  consult  each  other  in  the  most  appropriate 
framework  on  the  situation of  the  main  products,  with  a  view  to finding  ways 
of  maihtaining  a  satisfactory balance  bet~een supply  and  demand  in  the 
Mediterranean  area. 
With the  same  aim  in viet-r 1  the  Com.mu.ni ty  ~11ill  endeavour  j;o  ensu.re  that  its 
prcclucticm policy  d•:)88  not  clash 11i th the interests of the Nediterra."lean 
partners.  It wi.ll  also  have  to  enoow:·age  as  much  complem.encar·:i:ty  a.s  possible.-
between its ovm  and its  partners~ Ned:l.terraneau .l'J.g.r.-icu1tU1'ei  for  instance 
a8  regards  tho  t:i.ming of w·odudion and  ma.rketingo 
I:n  this  :-;onnection i;he  Commission vrou.ld  like to  cLt·aw  the Go1..mcil Vs  a·:;tention 
ones  a.,~·ain  i:o  the  importan~~ proposals ivhich it submitted  in  ·j 981  regarding 
e;::i st  i nr:  C.miimuni ty  rv<Le$  and tlw  <1eed  to  take  ·j nto  a~::counr  th~ ·e 'ffec t  Hh i  c·l~ 
decisions  are  like:ty to  h.ave  on relations with the Medi.ter:r'ensan partners. 
-
16.  Moreover  in oraer  to  imcrove  their trade  balancesp  the  agreements ·should,  as  far 
redu~e  their  dependence  on  food  imports 
rather- than  to  ·1nr.r-eas:2  the·ir'. o?.)<f)OI'ts<O  To  addeve  this  the)'  will  hove  to  rnake 
great  e·l"fesr·~·.s  to  devc:;Lop  egr·!cultural  potential.  -..there  ther·e  1s  a  short·fal!.  and 
attemnt  a  c:erta·in  ambunt  cf r·econvetsion  schemes  ...  for  uh.ich  ti·1ey  wilL  need  t'he · 
Community's  ha lp. - 12  -
Such  a  policy is undoubtedly  in their  own  interests,  since it will  enable 
them  to  become  leoB  dependent  on imports  of staple foodstuffs  in particular. 
However,  conversicn has  limits imposed  by soil a.nd  climatic Gonditions, 
&id it also  has  11l:'luman 11  limits  imposed  ·by  the  scv.'ci.t;y of tra:!.ning and 
skill&,  the weight  of tradhion and,  not  leastg  the social  consequences 
of eonversion.  Even more  than in the Cormnunity,  the problem  of  employment 
1  is an  enormous  obstacle to conversion  • 
17•  The main aim  of the  agreements  is to  promote the orderly expansion 
of trade.  'I
1 hi~ cannot  be  achieved unless  our  partners  have real  opport-Lmi ties 
to develop their exports  in sectors where  they are  capa.ble  of  producing. 
We  have  already  se1:3n  that.  these  tend to  be  products which,  in  the  Co1nmuni ty,. 
@re  ~ither sensitive at  present,  in particular textiles,  footwear  and processed 
foodstuffs,  or  capable  of  becoming  so  in  future,  such  as  petrochemicals. 
The  current  agr·eements  give the Mediterranean countries duty·-free access 
2  to the  Conmnmi ty market  for their industrial products  •  There can  be  no 
question of going back on these commitments 1  which were  entered into in 
1972  as  an important  factor  in the Mediterranean  countries~ development  policy. 
That  being  said~  a  mere  restatement  of principles will not  allay our  partnerse 
fears,  especially as  the general  economic  situation is no  longer the srune 
as it was  in  1972~  an~ is unlikely to become  so again,  and also because 
they are afraid th.."\.t  an enlarged Corrnnuni ty will  turn  more  than 
at present to restrictive measures  such as  those applied in the textiles 
1E.g.  15  ha,  of cereals is  equivalent in terms  of  income  and  employment  to 
about  1  ha of vegetables grown outsideo 
2with a  few  exceptions for certain agri-foods  and refined petroleum products 
(and apart  from  the system of ceilings for Yugoslavia). - 13-
sector, which hit  them  very hard  and  which they felt ran counter to the 
agreements. 
A restatement of the principle of freedom  of access  should therefore be 
accompanied  by  better functioning mutual  consultation machinery than that 
provided for  in the  present agreements,so that  proper  concerted action can 
be  taken whenever  necessary.  Through  exchanges  of information on market 
trends in sectors which  prove  to be  sensitive,  this machinery  should make 
it possible to  give early warning of crises and  improve  the  precision of 
measures  to deal with the threat of disturbances  on  either side.  We  must 
give  our  partners the necessary confidence in the functioning of their 
agreements  to  enable them  to plan their development,  and  hence  their 
investments,  taking account  of the opportunities offered by  the agreements. 
Although it would  be  unrealistic in the near future to make  any radical 
change in the situation in the textile sector,  further recourse to the kind 
of measures which  have  had to be  taken here should be avoided at all costs 
in other sectors. 
Cooperation 
18.  The  main  aim  of a  Mediterranean policy must  be  for  the Community  to 
help its partners with their  develo~ent, 1 while  respecting
1:·th~i'r  domestic 
and  foreign policies.  As  a  "civilian power"  the Community  has  certain 
advantages  in this respect  and it should make  the most  of them. - 14 -
We  must  discuss with them  how  and to what  extent  we  can help them  achieve 
their development  targets,  and tr,y to  support  a  certain orientation of  them  to 
achieve  as  much  complementarity  as  possible,  so  as  to  encourage  the  orderly 
expansion  of  trade  not  only  between  us  and  them,  but  amongst  themselves. 
Whether  we  are dealing with concertion  on  the  development  of  output  of  agri-
cultural  products  in  the  whole  area,  or with  the  industrial  strateqies  to 
be  geared to our own  structural adjustment  and  growth requirements, as  well  as  to 
our partners' development  needs,  the point is to  see that the Community 
acts with consistency in its own  Mediterranean regions,  the applicant 
countries and the Mediterranean partner countries,so that it reduces  rather 
than  stimulates  conflicts  of  interest. 
This means  stepping up cooperation within a  consistent framework  of 
Community  operations round the whole  areav  The  recent  agreement with 
Yugoslavia offers an avenue  of approach which should be explored more 
fully than it has been so far in our relations with trAt country. 
We  should be clear,  however,  that unless the money  and resources for 
this  cooperation,  in  which  our  partners  place  such  hopes,  are  forthcoming, 
we  may  condemn  them  to total  disillusion.  We  must 
at all costs avoid succumbing to the temptation to offer them  a  few 
sweeteners as e  ~  of inducing them  to accept unsatisfactory compromises 
simply to overcome  th~ir immediate diffioultieso  That might  enable us - 15  -
to "plaar for time" - a  few  years at best - but would  inevitably end  in 
a  period of  disappointment  which  could  cause  incalculable political  damage. 
The  Community must  make  more  money  available and provide for more  generous 
financial  protocols with fewer strings attached,  so that there are 
sufficient funds  in the form  of special loans - and grants too - to 
finance a·voluntaristimplementation of  the  cooperation  clauses. 
However,  the development  of these countries will mean  not  only their making 
the most  of their potential to produce and  process raw materials but 
also a  certain readjustment of production capacity and future plans in 
order to take account  of the changes in their opportunities for trading 
with the Community.  In these circumstances a  substantial contribution 
by the Community  to the development  of these countries will require 
resources  well  in  excess  of  what  can  be  provided  even  under  improved 
financial  protocols.  The  Community  should  do  all it  can  to swell  the 
flow  of  finance  to its Mediterranean partners,  either by  making  use  of 
its own  instruments  or  by  making  an  effort  to get  funds  mobilized on  the 
international  capital market. 
19.  Cooperation  on  social  matters  also  needs  a  boost.  The  virtual  closing of 
the  door  to  further  immigration  and  the  problem  of  integrating  immigrants 
into the  society of  the  host  countries,  above  all  in  the  regions  with 
concent~ations of  them,  could  lead  to~social unrest  with  grave  political 
consequences.  The  Community  owes  much  of  its prosperity to migrant  workers  -
it cannot  now  r~fuse its responsibility  ~or their future.  It should  increase 
its efforts to  give  them  true equality in their conditions of  life and  work. 
Their  own  countries of origin,  in  spite  of~r~at short;ges  of  jobs  and 
growing  populations,  suffer  from  a  lack  of  skilled  Labour  which  is  oite~ 
a  serious bottleneck  in  the  development  process..  This  1  s  a  field  ~n  1~hi ch 
cooperation  could  usefully be  stepped  up~  Most  "ember  Sts~es are  already - 16  -
implementing  bilateral  schemes  for  on-the-spot  training  in  the  host  country 
of  workers  who  are  needed  for  the  development  of  their country  of  origin. 
The  Community  should  encourage  and  assist  with  this  type  of  cooperation  by 
providing suitable  aid  for  these  schemes"  It  should  continue  and  strengthen 
its measures  to  encourage  the  integration of  immigrant  workers  and  their 
families  in  the  society of  their  host  countries. 
The  present  stalemate  over  the  implementation  of  the  social  security  clauses 
in  the  agreements  would  also  have  to  be  resolved  to our  partner's satisfaction, 
in  line  with  our  undertakings. 
CONCLUSIONS 
20.  After enlargement  the  Community  must  have  an internally 
consistent overall  policy for the whole  Mediterranean area.  There 
can be  no  real  Mediterranean policy if Mediterranean countries are 
denied  access  to  the  Community  market,  and  that  market will not 
open up,  despite  the  considerable net benefit  to the  Community  as  a 
whole,  if the whole  brunt  of liberalization is to  be  borne  by  the 
poorest  Community  regions.  The  Community  gains overall from its 
economic  relations with  the  Mediterranean countries,  but  we  must  not 
overlook  the underlying regional inequalities, which  the  Mediterranean 
policy will intensify unless  steps are  taken to prevent this.  Without 
help  for  these vulnerable  regions,  particularly the  Mediterranean  reg1ons 
(but  not  only  them),the  development  of  the  Mediterranean  policy  would 
inevitably conflict  with  the  policy of  internal  convergence  that  we  seek 
to advance  through  the  reinforcing of  Comm~nity solidarity" · 
Thus  the  external  M~diterranean policy  implies  the  vigorous  pursuit of  internal 
development  as  well,  through  a  more  ambitious  and  betterfunded  regional  policy, 
a  social  policy  more  active  and  better adapted  to  the  Mediterranean  regions  and 
a  redirection of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy. - 1'?  .. 
The  Mediterranean  regioffiof  the  Community  are  generally more  exposed  than· 
the  others  to  the  consequences  of  enlargement  and  of  the  external  Mediterranean 
policy of  the  Community.  Their  situation calls, therefore,  for  specific 
me~sures, particularly  in  the  fields  mentioned  above.  They  should  be 
implemented  in  the  framework  of  the  "Community  programmes"  advocated  by 
the  Commission  in  its report  on  the  mandate  of  30th  May.1 
The  external  Mediterranean  policy can  also affect  certain sectors not  Limited 
to  the  Mediterranean  regions.  These  side-effects,  more  sectoral  than  regional, 
should  be  dealt  with  by  measures  applicable  in all the  regions  of  the  Community 
affected. 
21.  The  external  objective  of  cooperation  worthy  of  the  interests  which  Link 
us  to  the  Mediterranean  countries  would  no  doubt  be  better served  by  a  global 
convention  between  the  two  regions,  along  the  lines of  the  Lorn~  Convention 
but  between  the  Community  and  all  its Mediteranean partners.  This  collective 
contract,  which  should  not  replace  the  individual  agreements  between  the 
Community  and  each  Mediterranean  country but  rather  complement  them,  would 
balance  relations  and  so  make  them  Less  vulnerable  to sectoral  or  immediate 
economic  difficulties.  Such  a  project  cannot  be  realised in  the  immediate 
future,  but  the  option  should  be  kept  open. 
Moreover  as  many  institutional  and  operational  Links  as  possible  should be  set 
up  between  our  present  agreements  and  the  various  forms  of  current  or  future 
cooperation  with  the  rest  of  the  Arab  world  (co-financing,  joint  financing, 
mutual  investment  protection,  transfer of  technology,  etc.). 
'  At  the exclusively Mediterranean level i·t  would  a.lso be a  good  idea when 
implementing the current agreements to coordinate cooperation and development 
a.cti  vi  tieso  Such an approach could be expressed institutionally in joint 
meetings of representatives of the various Cooperation Councils or 
Committees  or joint parliamentar.y oommittees. 
1  See  paragraphs  27  to  30  of  this  report. - 18  -
The  setting up  of'  a  "Mediterranean Forum"  for meetings and  discussions 
along the lines of'  the Council of'_ Europe,  where  the ma.ey  countries of 
"'"'  n::~g.i(•tt  eL•Ii1t1  in;:o.1titf:l..in.  onutt:lot  do!:liJJ Le  tho n.ll  too  trntp~tml.  !.r,rd~lln~m 
of communications between them  would  increase the chances  f'or  stability 
and  developnent  in the entire  area~ The  Community  should support any 
initiatives which have  alre~.been or are still to.be taken in this 
direction. 
22.  One  major  external  question  remains;  the  effect  of  a  Community  Mediterranean 
policy on  relations with third countries,  and the United States in particular. 
The  disagreement  with that country  to  which the Mediterranean policy 
has  given rise has  f'lared  up  on a  number  of'  occasions since 1973,  but 
until now  such disputes have always been settled on  the basis of the 
Casey-Soames  understanding.  The  USA's  new  stand in GATT  suggests that 
the disagreement  could  intensi~. This is a  problem  which it would  be 
wrong  to  underestimate. 
The  question  is  whether  American  hostility to  the  development  of  the 
Mediterranean  agreements  of  the  Community,  in  the  field of  trade  policy, 
could  be  reduced  by  an  understanding of  the  political  impact  of  its Mediterranean 
policy. 
THE  NEED  FOR  A DECISION 
23.  In  any  case,  the  Community  must  come  to  a  rapid  decision  on  those 
options;  they  are  part  of  the  general  rethinking  it must  undertake  at  the  moment 
when  it must  accelerate  the  process  of  adhesion  of  Spain  and  Portugal 
which  the  Commission  still considers  to  be  realistic  and  politically  important. 
z:4_.  There  is  need, _theref_ore,  for  a  procedure  which,  \-Jithout  compromising 
"the  Community's  independence  of  decision  or  interfering  with  the  norr11al_ cour_s.c.  of 
the  accession  negotiations,  will  sufficiently  reassure  our  Mediterranean  partners. 
S~nce the procedure used in 1972  and  1979  was unaoceptable to them,  and 
the idea of "parallel negotia.tionan  which  some  of them  were  advooa.ting, 
is equally unacceptable to the Community  and the applicant  countries, 
there must  be a  compromise  approach to reconcile the main points of 
oonoern on either aideo ..  19  -
To  achieve this the main priority ~or the Community  is to arrive 
L~iftly at a  position on  the,broad outlines o£ the Mediterranean policy 
which it feels it should promote  in the futureo 
These guidelines  should then be  submitted to the applicant  countries, 
~-s  __ :h~ir cormnitment  is essential for our par1ners.  They  mey- be 
confident  that  the  Community  intends  to  take  account  of  their  concernR 
but  they  fear  that  Spain  and  Portuga~ at  the  moment  they  already  have  to 
bear  the  shock  of  adhesion,  would  oppose  the  implementation  of  a  policy on 
which  they  have  not  been  consulted.  It  must  be  said that  the attitude of 
the  Community  has  not  until  now  presented  real  opportunities  for  finishing 
the  negotiations  for  adhesion  and  so  makes  it difficult  for  the  candidates 
to  adopt  an  open attitude  towards  a  problem  directly  Linked  to aspects  of 
the  negotiations  important  for  them. 
once  these  broad outlines  have  been  agreed  on  by  the  Twelve,  the  Commission  means 
to open  this  autumn  exploratory talks  with  the  Mediterranean  partners this  autumn 
on  the  basis  of  those  guidelines.  This  would  be  so  that  by  the  end  of  the  year, 
in view  of  the  timetable  for  enalrgement,  the  Council  could  have  a  clear picture 
of  the  situation,  particularly of  the  partners'  concrete  positions. 
In the Conunission's  view this course  of action can reconcile the 
different requirements  of  the parties.  It will also mean  that the 
negotiating mandates  proper  can be  worked  out  on  a  firmer basis  and 
t k::  nt~g-0 t.intl0nr:  condur. too  in tho  interim poriorl  ( 1983)  in an enlightened 
atmosphere  of mutual  trust  1  to  give  the  enlarged Conununi ty a  Mediterranean 
policy in keeping with the political,  economic  and  social objectives implicit 
in its "1--leightier  role in this  important,  dynamic  and  volatile region. 
The  Community  cannot  and  must  not  let its immediate domestic  and  external 
difficulties deter it from  following such a  policy.  In the  long run the 
Corrununi ty 's  mm  economic  recovery v-rill  depend  to  a.  great  extent  on  its 
ability to participate in the development  process  of the least developed 
countries.  The  Mediterranean is an area of considerable importance,  in 
relation to which  the ColiiDlunity,  for  historical and  geographical reasons, 
is in a  u.11ique  posi  ti.on and  has responsibilities it cannot  shirk. - 20  -
In  this  Communication  the  Commission's  intention was  to sketch out  a 
framework  and  guidelin~s for  the Community's  Mediterranean policy at a 
-
time when  the Community  is about to acquire a  greater Mediterranean bias. 
This  Comrriunication will  naturally have  to be  supplemented  by  a  set  of 
proposals  aimed  at  implementing the principles which are adopted. 
The  Commission feels,  however,  that it is necessary  to obtain the Council's 
agreement  and  the  support  of the applicant  countries on the guidelines 
which should  be  adopted,  in the light of experience  gained and,  above 
all,  the cond.i tions  under which the Med.i terranean policy will  have  to be 
implemented in the years  to  come.  Not  until the partner countries  have 
given their reactions to  the guidelines adopted  by  the  Council will  the 
Commission be able to analyse in greater detail the  problems  of each sector 
and  each country or  group of countries,  in order to  submit to the Council 
practical proposals  for  solutions best  suited to  each specific situation 
in the framework  of the overall  policy to be  implemented. 